So after a carefully walk around the outside of the aircraft where the Static and Pitot ports are checked un-obstructed; no indications from your EICAS that there are any problems with the Air Data System during taxi; you barrel down the runway, cross check the airspeed when you hear the call “Eighty Knots!” and see […]
While this article still has relevant content – the procedural aspects of the Rejected Landing After Touchdown manoeuvre have been superseded by changes to the Boeing FCTM and are reflected in the subsequent post Boeing 777 Baulked (Balked) Landing. While it’s far too early to tell what actually happened, in light of EK521 it’s perhaps germane […]
Recently I attended Day One of an industry workshop sponsored by CASA and the University of NSW on “Human Factors and the Automated Flight Deck.” Day One consisted of a series of highly qualified and experienced speakers across a range of regulatory based automation management subjects, and Day Two we moved into a series of […]
The Airspeed Unreliable scenarios is one of the more challenging non normals faced by pilots in the simulator. Of the many serious malfunctions I’ve witnessed crew deal with in the simulator – this one more than any other has caught crew out to the point of a serious limitation exeedence (high/low airspeed) or potentially an […]
A while ago I scheduled a temperature inversion in a simulator session in preparation for our operation to Abu Dhabi’s summer. For further reflections see Performance Limited Takeoff and High Temperature Departure Abu Dhabi. The issue of temperature inversions and the implications for takeoff performance calculation raised so many issues that I ended up having […]
After a debacle in Abu Dhabi – and another occurrence involving offload and a 4 hour delay – I was asked to prepare some specific advice for Captains operating out of Abu Dhabi. Background Due to high temperatures, most Abu Dhabi departures during mid-Summer experience a potential performance penalty for departure; in most cases resulting […]
Boeing have begun incorporating an “Additional Information” section at the end of some NNM checklists. Presently on the 777 this feature exists for the Ice Crystal Icing, Airspeed Unreliable, and Fuel Leak checklists. It is interesting to note that despite the location of this information at the end of the checklist, the information is clearly […]
Friend and fellow podcaster Karlene Pettit recently blogged on managing the A330 speed/configuration during approach. I thought it might be interesting to explore the topic on the 777. The point of Karlene’s article is that often the manfacturer’s profile doesn’t comply with the ATC environment we find ourselves in, and the performance characteristics of the aircraft we fly are such […]
Boeing won’t tell you what you want to know (which is usually everything) about a NnM – just what you Need to know.
Many Airlines (or more accurately the Trainers of the Training Department) specify a series of checks at Top Of Climb. Often there’s no basis in this from an Airline SOP’s or Manufacturers point of view – which doesn’t mean they’re not valuable for situational awareness …
Sometimes you need to be able to calculate a limiting ZFW based on a forced change in TOW. You can use the OFP LNDG correction figure to do it. And it’s not VooDoo – just mathematics.
It seems simple – but when manoeuvring at a minimum flap speed, the time to set final approach speed is … when on final approach.
Managing a departure with a performance limited takeoff can be one of the more challenging tasks that face the Captain of an aircraft today. It all sounds simple enough in theory. Based on the Airport/Runway, Ambient Weather Conditions and Aircraft, a computer will spit out down to the kilogram how much weight you’re allowed to lift off the runway. From this number a passenger/cargo and fuel load is determined – and off you go. But all is not as it seems.
Some time ago I wrote down all that I had been taught and learned about operating the Boeing 777 Electronic Checklist (ECL) in conjunction with the onboard Electronic Indication and Crew Alert System (EICAS). I’ve updated it along the way as I became an instructor and it’s become more and more of a formal document […]
The recent recurrent training phase included a SLATS DRIVE failure during takeoff at high weight. At some point, the crew is confronted with the decision about whether to retract flap or not. The results of doing so would not be so amusing had I not done the same myself ……
