I’m working on an update to the Practices and Techniques document I developed in 2008. While this has been a published document in my airline for several years, it was recently taken offline and is now a training background reference, as was the original intention for it’s development. Just one of the many subjects beng […]
I’m working on an update to the Practices and Techniques document I developed in 2008. While this has been a published document in my airline for several years, it was recently taken offline and is now a training background reference, as was the original intention for it’s development. Just one of the many subjects currently […]
The last phase of recurrent simulator training included a two engine go-around after a Slats Drive failure. For no apparent reason the AP/FD pitches to less than 10 degrees and accelerates well through Flap Limit speed. According to Boeing, this is expected behavior.
Weather avoidance is part and parcel of an airline pilot’s standard task list. From the Mark One Eyeball to the Rockwell Collins WXR-2100 Weather Radar there are various tools available to assist in this task; all of which leverage the training and experience an airline pilot brings to the flight deck. But my last trip […]
A while ago I was looking into tail clearances on takeoff, rotation technique and most importantly what tools were available to train and evaluate rotation technique in the simulator and the aircraft. As part of this review the question was raised about the calling of “Rotate” on takeoff and the initiation of the rotation manoeuvre […]
In another article, I discuss the issue of acceleration and cleanup in the missed approach. The Boeing 777 FCTM mentions accelerating at 1000 ft (AAL) in the missed approach, and many airlines use this point on two engine missed approaches. As discussed – this is inappropriate and potentially dangerous in the event of a single […]
Next time you reach up for something on the Mode Control Panel (MCP) – try and remember that 50,000 volts could be involved … Let me explain.
After an 8 month hiatus – I returned to flying in August to the Los Angele route. On my first trip, I noticed that during the return sector from LA we had burnt more fuel than I could readily account for, and the FMC Progress Page Calculated Fuel was somewhat lower than the Totalizer fuel […]
I was recently asked whether we could still use LNAV to fly a Localizer Instrument Approach, and whether that was the preferred mode. This question was asked during a briefing on PBN which has caused some confusion. Recently we’ve seen some changes in the way we do aircraft Navigation, or at least in the way […]
A not-so recent amendment to the B777 FCTM (followed by a more recent update to the FCOM and QRH) instigated a procedure where ENG OUT mode of the FMC VNAV page is selected (confirmed) and EXECuted once CONtinuous thrust has been set after takeoff. While this sounds logical and orderly – as usual the devil […]
Some time ago I wrote about a review of a Decision Making Model (FORDEC). During that article I clarified that there is a clear difference between a Decision Making Model versus a Non Normal Management Model. Usually you have to deal with the NNM first before you get as far into the flight as having […]
There has been some discussion recently around FMC scratchpad messages, their role in flight deck alerting, and an appropriate crew response. Most particularly around the habit that some crew develop – usually during transition simulator training when many spurious messages are generated and often cleared without real understanding of their meaning). We areseeing this in the sim […]
This failure seems simple enough – one of the engines is low on oil pressure; the checklist reduces thrust and shuts down the affected engine. Then there’s the reality of dealing with an engine NNM under various conditions of high altitude and high thrust settings. This failure has something of a history in 777 simulator […]
There is (what can only be described as) a software bug in the Thrust Reference setting software in the 777. While this bug manifests itself in several situation on normal and non-normal operations, it manifests significantly with flight safety implications during VNAV engine out approaches. I discovered this issue back in the late 90’s when I […]
A runway change can be highly destructive to mental model the crew establish during preflight of the aircraft departure. Dozens of decisions, selections and entries are often required to be evaluated and implemented – often while the engines are running and aircraft are waiting behind you.
